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Protecting tropical forests from the rapid expansion
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Expansion of Hevea brasiliensis rubber plantations is a resurgent driver of deforestation,
carbon emissions, and biodiversity loss in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asian rubber extent is
massive, equivalent to 67% of oil palm, with rapid further expansion predicted. Results-based
carbon ﬁnance could dis-incentivise forest conversion to rubber, but efﬁcacy will be limited
unless payments match, or at least approach, the costs of avoided deforestation. These
include opportunity costs (timber and rubber proﬁts), plus carbon ﬁnance scheme setup
(transaction) and implementation costs. Using comprehensive Cambodian forest data,
exploring scenarios of selective logging and conversion, and assuming land-use choice is
based on net present value, we ﬁnd that carbon prices of $30–$51 per tCO2 are needed to
break even against costs, higher than those currently paid on carbon markets or through
carbon funds. To defend forests from rubber, either carbon prices must be increased, or other
strategies are needed, such as corporate zero-deforestation pledges, and governmental
regulation and enforcement of forest protection.
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Forest is being converted to Hevea brasiliensis rubber plan-tations across Southeast Asia, resulting in the loss of forestcarbon stocks and substantial declines in biodiversity1–3.
Eighty ﬁve per cent of global rubber area occurs in Southeast
Asia, where expansion has driven northward into Cambodia,
China, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (hereafter termed mainland
Southeast Asia, but also known as the Indo-Burma biodiversity
hotspot), replacing forest and traditional swidden cultivation1,2.
Despite its massive extent (8.6 million ha in Southeast Asia in
2014, equivalent to 67% of oil palm extent4) and comparable
negative consequences for biodiversity and ecosystem services5,
conversion of forest to rubber monoculture has not faced the
same public scrutiny as oil palm. Here, we analyse carbon out-
comes and opportunity costs of forgoing forest conversion to
rubber, including proﬁts from timber extraction, and ask whether
permitting selective logging could reduce these opportunity costs
to improve the likelihood of success for forest carbon ﬁnance.
Where climatic conditions are suitable for both oil palm and
rubber, they can generate similar proﬁts per unit land area, but oil
palm provides better returns if labour supply is restricted5.
However, rubber can tolerate a wider range of climatic conditions
and soil types, permitting its expansion into mainland Southeast
Asia2, although reduced yields and tree mortality are reported
from many northern parts of its range1. Recent expansion of
rubber has mostly occurred in areas unsuitable for oil palm1,6.
Demand for natural rubber continues to grow, predominantly
driven by the tyre industry, and plantations are predicted to
expand by 4.3–8.5 million ha within a decade2. This expansion
not only threatens forest carbon stocks, but also has serious
implications for biodiversity conservation. The forests of main-
land Southeast Asia are globally unique ecosystems, supporting
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Fig. 1 Scenarios of intervention to protect forest from conversion to rubber. Schematic shows scenarios of intervention to protect remaining forest in: initial
state (“No timber logged”); after selective logging (“Luxury timber logged” or “Luxury, I, II timber logged”) and after all trees (≥40 cm DBH) have been
logged (“All trees logged”). Tree species are assigned to one of four royalty classes: luxury, I, II, III or non-classiﬁed (NC; Supplementary Data 1) based on a
governmental list69; collection of luxury timber includes all stems ≥10 cm DBH, for other classes stems ≥40 cm DBH. “Timber” refers to luxury, class I and
class II species; class III and NC species are non-commercial, and are thus termed “trees”. All resin trees are classiﬁed as class II. The left column considers
opportunity costs (OC) of protecting forests following scenarios of logging only, where conversion to rubber is prohibited; the right column considers
opportunity costs of protecting forests following scenarios of logging, with the additional opportunity costs of forgone conversion to rubber
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numerous threatened and endemic animal, bird, invertebrate and
plant species7,8, including exceptionally valuable luxury timbers
(eg, rosewoods, Dalbergia spp.).
Rubber prices are currently relatively low (Supplementary
Fig. 1), offering a lull in expansion, and an opportunity to develop
strategies for future planting that minimise negative outcomes for
climate and forests. Stemming rubber expansion onto
biodiversity-rich forest could reduce carbon emissions and
achieve conservation gains simultaneously, making efﬁcient use
of limited funds9,10. However, the effectiveness of any forest
carbon ﬁnance scheme will depend on the number of carbon
credits generated, the perceived costs of conserving forest and the
price offered for carbon credits.
Costs of forest conservation can be broken down into practical
costs of conservation activities (transaction and implementation
costs) and the costs of forgone economic activity (opportunity
costs); these are borne at local, sub-national or national scales. In
contrast, the economic costs of climate change are largely borne
globally. Estimates of damage costs caused by carbon emissions
are termed the “social cost of carbon”, and are used in the design
of policies to regulate carbon emissions11. Such estimates have
been made using various methodologies, and vary by an order of
magnitude11–16, but perhaps the most policy-relevant is that
developed for the government of the United States ($36 per tCO2
in 201511,13,17), which we use to discuss the context of our results.
We analysed the carbon outcomes and opportunity costs of
forgoing forest conversion to rubber, including proﬁts from
timber extraction, and asked whether permitting selective logging
could reduce opportunity costs and improve the likelihood of
success for forest carbon ﬁnance. We modelled scenarios of
protecting either intact forest (“No timber logged”), or forest
degraded by permitting selective logging (felling only trees ≥40
cm DBH at three intensity levels, depending on timber royalty/
value classes: (1) “Luxury logged”; (2) “Luxury, I, II logged”; (3)
“All trees logged”), from subsequent conversion to rubber (Fig. 1;
Supplementary Note 1). We calculated rubber proﬁts based on
typical monocultural plantation systems, containing high-yielding
clonal varieties of rubber planted at densities of 400–550 stems
per ha18. Such systems are ubiquitous across mainland Southeast
Asia, within both smallholdings and larger estates1,19–21. We also
included the economic value of dipterocarp tree resin collection
as an economic beneﬁt of forests retaining class I and II timber
species (all resin species are class II). As future market changes
could inﬂuence the relative proﬁtability of alternative crops, we
also considered potential proﬁts from other cash crops in Cam-
bodia: cassava, cashew, and sugarcane. For each scenario, we
estimated the breakeven carbon price ($ per tCO2) that would
match the opportunity costs of forgoing further logging and
conversion to rubber, plus the transaction and implementation
costs of a carbon ﬁnance scheme. We used a substantial inventory
data of 20,281 trees (DBH ≥10 cm; Supplementary Table 1) from
six forest landscapes in Cambodia widely spaced across ~260 km
of dense and open forest (Supplementary Fig. 2) to make highly
robust estimates of forest carbon stock and timber volumes.
These span two forest types in zones climatically suitable for
rubber1: “dense” evergreen and semi-evergreen (35–55 m height)
and “open” deciduous/mixed-deciduous forests (25–35 m)22.
They include the largest remaining contiguous lowland evergreen
forest in mainland Southeast Asia23 and globally signiﬁcant
extents of open forest24.
Using cost beneﬁt analysis and net present value, we ﬁnd that
the carbon prices needed to match the costs of protecting intact
or selectively-logged forests in mainland Southeast Asia from
conversion to rubber are $29.86–$37.48 per tCO2 for dense for-
ests, or $30.93–$51.11 per tCO2 for open forests. Rubber forms a
far greater proportion of opportunity costs than timber, and
breakeven carbon prices are much lower under scenarios of
logging alone. Our calculated prices are higher than those cur-
rently paid on carbon markets (~$5–$13 per tCO2), or through
carbon funds (~$5 per tCO2), but are close to, or below, policy-
relevant estimates of the social cost of carbon ($36 per tCO2). The
mismatch between predicted social costs of carbon at the global
scale, carbon market prices and the local costs of avoiding carbon
emissions from deforestation, poses a serious challenge for forest
carbon ﬁnance in tackling global climate change. Given our
ﬁndings, additional strategies beyond carbon ﬁnance will be
needed to prevent forest conversion to rubber. However, risk
aversion and non-economic values of forest could reduce the
carbon payments needed to leverage protection, relative to our
calculations.
Results
Timber volume and carbon stocks. Harvestable wood volume of
all tree species, assuming a minimum harvestable DBH of 40 cm
(≥10 cm for luxury timber; Supplementary Note 1), was 49.4 ±
0.5 m3 per ha in dense forest, but just 13.6 ± 0.3 m3 per ha in open
forest (mean ± SE; Table 1). Timber of royalty classes I and II
accounted for 54% of volume in dense forest and 69% in open
forest. Luxury timber was rare, contributing only 1.1 ± 0.0 m3 per
ha in dense forest (2%) and 1.3 ± 0.1 m3 per ha in open forest
(10%).
Mean forest carbon stocks, measured as combined above-
ground and below-ground biomass (AGB and BGB) of all stems
Table 1 Mean carbon stock and wood volume held in harvestable stems of each timber royalty class in dense and open forests
Forest type Timber
royalty class
Carbon stock
≥40 cm DBH
(tC per ha)
Carbon stock
≥30 cm DBH
(tC per ha)
Wood volume
≥40 cm DBH
(m3 per ha)
Wood volume
≥30 cm DBH
(m3 per ha)
Dense Luxury 2.2 ± 0.0 1.1 ± 0.3
I 30.8 ± 0.4 35.0 ± 0.4 16.9 ± 0.2 19.2 ± 0.3
II 12.1 ± 0.3 14.6 ± 0.3 9.8 ± 0.2 12.1 ± 0.2
III 3.5 ± 0.1 5.3 ± 0.1 2.4 ± 0.1 3.4 ± 0.1
Non-classiﬁed 39.0 ± 0.4 53.5 ± 0.5 19.3 ± 0.2 26.2 ± 0.2
Open Luxury 1.8 ± 0.1 1.3 ± 0.1
I 20.5 ± 0.5 29.5 ± 0.1 6.6 ± 0.1 14.7 ± 0.3
II 4.6 ± 0.1 9.1 ± 0.0 2.7 ± 0.1 7.0 ± 0.1
III 0.5 ± 0.0 1.2 ± 0.4 0.3 ± 0.0 1.5 ± 0.0
Non-classiﬁed 8.0 ± 0.3 12.6 ± 0.1 2.7 ± 0.1 8.0 ± 0.2
Mean carbon stock and wood volume are shown with the 95% conﬁdence interval of the mean
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≥10 cm DBH, were 194 ± 1.2 tC per ha in dense forest (123–284
tC per ha among individual landscapes) and 104 ± 0.8 tC per ha
in open forest (60–157 tC per ha among landscapes; Table 1,
Supplementary Fig. 3). Lower carbon stocks in open forest
reﬂected both a greater proportion of smaller stems (Supplemen-
tary Fig. 4) and lower stem density (mean across inventories
213–311 per ha in open; 415–589 per ha in dense; Supplementary
Data 1), despite similar wood density (weighted mean 0.713 g cm
−3 in open; 0.630 g cm−3 in dense).
Forest carbon stock changed minimally following selective
logging of luxury timber (“Luxury logged” scenario), reducing by
1% in dense forest and 2% in open. Additional logging of classes I
and II (“Luxury, I, II logged”) reduced carbon stocks by 20% in
dense forest (to 175 ± 1.1 tC per ha) and 26% in open forest (to
78 ± 0.7 tC per ha; Table 1; Fig. 2). Even the removal of all trees
≥40 cm DBH (“All trees logged”), left 60% (dense), and 66%
(open) of original carbon stock. Therefore, substantial forest
carbon is retained before conversion to rubber, even after logging
of valuable timber or removing all large trees.
Rubber plantations are considered forest cover in FAO Forest
Resources Assessments25, while the USAID LEAF Atlas maps
rubber-dominated landscapes as forest (such as Southern Thai-
land), but protected open forests in Eastern Cambodia as non-
forest26. However, we ﬁnd that even assuming high post-
deforestation time-averaged carbon stocks (taCs) for rubber of
52.5 tC per ha (from Cambodia, Thailand and Indonesia3, likely
greater than will be achieved in seasonal open forest environ-
ments), conversion of intact forest to rubber would still generate
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Fig. 3 Opportunity costs and breakeven carbon prices needed to protect forests from logging and conversion to rubber. Opportunity costs a–d include
forgone proﬁts from logging and rubber, or logging alone, offset by resin revenue except where resin trees (all class II) are logged out (in the “Luxury, I, II
logged” and “All trees logged” scenarios). Breakeven carbon prices e–h are the prices needed to offset combined opportunity costs and carbon ﬁnance
scheme setup (transaction) and implementation costs. Costs are shown separately for dense and open forests. Time-averaged post-deforestation land-use
carbon stocks (taCs) partially offset forest carbon losses. Scenarios (of permitted selective logging, with and without potential for conversion to rubber)
follow Fig. 1; boxplot format as Fig. 2. Grey lines on breakeven carbon price panels e–h represent indicative global carbon prices: dotted= $5 per tCO2
(voluntary market forest carbon sales and non-market carbon fund prices), short dash= $13 per tCO2 (compliance market prices) and long dash= $36 per
tCO2 (social cost of carbon, not shown on “Logging forgone” plots; see Supplementary Table 4). Outliers (>1.5× the interquartile range) are not displayed
to improve the clarity of the ﬁgure; the value shown above each box-whisker gives the n outliers excluded out of 10,000 modelled results
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net losses of 141.5 ± 1.2 tC per ha in dense forest and 51.5 ± 0.8 tC
per ha in open forest (Fig. 2). Even conversion of degraded logged
open forest would generate net emissions, as well as biodiversity
loss. Additionally, although we do not account for changes in soil
organic carbon (SOC) because the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) tier 1 carbon outcome calculation
method assumes no SOC change with conversion to perennial
tree crops, conversion of lowland forest to rubber plantations
does generate SOC emissions27, which, if included, would
increase net emissions.
Logging and conversion to rubber. Total opportunity costs of
protecting intact forest (“No timber logged+ forgone rubber”
scenario), calculated as the proﬁt from a single offtake of all
commercial timber (Supplementary Table 2) plus the 25-year net
present value (NPV; 10% discount rate) from subsequent rubber
plantations (Supplementary Table 3), were $16,841 (median,
interquartile range $12,118–$21,397) per ha in dense forest and
$7,674 ($4,581–$11,250) per ha in open forest (Fig. 3). Inter-
vening after removal of luxury timber (“Luxury timber logged+
forgone rubber” scenario) reduced opportunity costs of logging
by 38% in dense forest and 56% in open; however, total oppor-
tunity costs (including rubber) were only reduced to $15,097
($10,738–$19,390) per ha and $5,956 ($3,341–$8,663) per ha,
respectively. After all valuable timber had been logged out
(“Luxury, I, II, logged” or “All trees logged”), the opportunity cost
of rubber alone was $12,570 ($8,436–$16,698) per ha in dense
forest, and $5,089 ($2,532-$7,764) per ha in open forest. Rubber
therefore forms the majority of total opportunity costs (75% of
median in dense forest, 66% in open forest). The substantially
lower NPV of rubber in open forest arises from the delay of
tapping from 6 years to 10 years after planting, due to slower tree
growth in drier conditions. Using a discount rate of 8% to allow
comparison, our estimate of rubber NPV in dense forest areas
($16,533 per ha, $11,403–$21,732 per ha) is similar to estimates
from lowland Xishuangbanna, China (~$19,800 per ha, 25-year
NPV, 8% discount rate)21.
High-opportunity costs translated into high breakeven carbon
prices, far greater than indicative carbon prices currently paid in
voluntary carbon market sales and carbon funds ($5 per tCO2) or
compliance market sales ($13 per tCO2), although for dense
forests, breakeven prices were below the estimated social cost of
carbon ($36 per tCO2; Supplementary Table 4). Protecting intact
forest (“No timber logged+ forgone rubber”) required $33.43
(median, interquartile range $22.65–$48.20) per tCO2 for dense
forest and $51.11 ($15.59–$120.19) per tCO2 for open forest
(Fig. 3). Removal of luxury timber reduced breakeven prices to
$29.86 ($20.02–$44.96) per tCO2 in dense forest and $30.93
($11.95–$87.78) per tCO2 in open forest, bringing the latter below
the estimated social cost. This was because luxury timber
comprised only a small proportion of forest carbon (Table 1),
but a large proportion of timber value (Supplementary Table 2),
so that logging opportunity costs were substantially reduced while
forest carbon stocks remained mostly intact. Although further
logging of all valuable timber (“Luxury, I, II logged+ rubber”)
reduced the opportunity costs of logging to zero, breakeven prices
in this scenario were actually higher than the intact forest
scenario for dense forest ($37.48, $23.28–$60.90 per tCO2), and
reduced only slightly in open forest ($48.83, $17.56–$135.18 per
tCO2). This was due to the large proportion of forest carbon held
in class I and II species (Table 1); removing large trees of these
timber classes substantially depleted residual carbon stocks while
reducing logging opportunity costs. With fewer carbon credits a
greater breakeven price was needed to offset the opportunity cost
of rubber. In a few model iterations, conversion of heavily
degraded open forest to rubber generated net carbon gains,
producing negative carbon prices. This effect is further shown in
Fig. 4; although variation in opportunity costs leads to substantial
variation in carbon prices, in both forest types, prices also
decrease as forest carbon stocks increase.
Sensitivity analysis. Farm gate prices for rubber strongly inﬂu-
enced carbon breakeven prices in both dense and open forest
(Fig. 5). To make our results robust to short-term price volatility
(Supplementary Fig. 1), we used a 10-year mean price
(2003–2012; $2,595 ± 200 per t). However, even using the rela-
tively low 2014 rubber price ($1,644 ± 200 per t, indexed at ~0.6
relative to the 10-year mean in Fig. 5), breakeven prices in the
“No timber logged+ forgone rubber” scenario only reduced to
$19.09 ($11.52–$27.82) per tCO2 in dense forest, and $16.08
($0.14–$60.65) per tCO2 in open forest, still higher than carbon
market prices, although well below the estimated social cost.
The NPVs of three alternative cash crops (cassava, cashew and
sugarcane) were also considered, to account for potential future
changes in relative proﬁtability or demand for agricultural
commodities. Oil palm was not assessed as much of mainland
Southeast Asia is marginal or unsuitable for its cultivation6;
however, 25-year oil palm NPV in Malaysia was estimated to be
$11,240 per ha28. Estimates of cassava NPV exceeded that of
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rubber ($14,597, $10,133–$19,124 per ha), but other crops were
less proﬁtable (Supplementary Table 3). We note that cassava
yields and prices could be lower than our estimates, due to the
potential for nutrient depletion with repeated cultivation and lack
of access to markets, which we have not accounted for
(Supplementary Table 5). Although all three crops store less
carbon than rubber (Supplementary Table 6), cassava and cashew
still generated high breakeven carbon prices in the “No timber
logged” scenarios: for cassava $27.02 ($19.59–$36.66) per tCO2 in
dense forest and $49.76 ($31.54–$76.14) per tCO2 in open forest,
and for cashew $21.98 ($15.29–$30.31) per tCO2 and $47.21
($25.59–$75.52) per tCO2, respectively (Supplementary Fig. 5).
Breakeven prices were affected by crop price, as for rubber
(Supplementary Fig. 6), but omitting potential revenues from
dipterocarp resin harvest (Supplementary Table 7), and changing
resin prices (Supplementary Fig. 6), had negligible effects on
breakeven prices.
Predicted NPVs of all crops were highly sensitive to changes in
discount rate. Rubber NPV increased to ~$25,800 per ha with a
5% discount rate in dense forest (giving a breakeven carbon price
of $60.04, $41.20–$88.06 per tCO2 assuming protection of an
intact forest) and $14,700 per ha in open forest ($108.68, $43.43–
$255.92 per tCO2). A 15% discount rate reduced rubber NPV to ~
$6,200 per ha in dense forest ($20.62, $13.60–$29.41 per tCO2)
and $1,100 per ha in open forest ($20.12, $3.47–$62.34 per tCO2;
Supplementary Table 3 and Figs. 7, 8). We use 10% for our main
analysis to allow comparability with other studies, but the choice
of discount rate introduces substantial variation in our estimates
of opportunity cost. Discount rates of 5% are commonly used in
social investments29, but discount rates of 8% have been
recommended for cost-beneﬁt analysis in Asia21; we therefore
present the full range of NPV results in Supplementary Table 3.
Logging without conversion to rubber. If the threat of forest
conversion to rubber could be removed, our analysis shows that
carbon prices close to those currently paid on voluntary markets
and carbon funds ($5 per tCO2) could meet the opportunity costs
of logging in mainland Southeast Asia. This could be achieved
through governmental land-use planning or zoning, market
exclusion of “deforestation rubber” via development of a robust
sustainability initiative30, or further corporate zero deforestation
commitments such as that announced by Michelin31. In this case,
opportunity costs of forgoing logging (“No timber logged”) were
less than a quarter ($3,443, $1,151–$6,490 per ha) in dense forest
and around a ﬁfth ($1,534, $563–$4,356 per ha) in open forest
(Fig. 3, Supplementary Table 2) of the costs of forgoing both
logging and rubber in the “No timber logged+ rubber forgone”
scenario. Consequently, if forest conversion is prevented by other
means, the median breakeven carbon price of protecting intact
dense forest from any logging was only $4.27 ($1.33–$8.56) per
tCO2, and $2.43 ($0.95–$11.95) per tCO2 in open (Fig. 3).
Changes in timber price inﬂuenced breakeven carbon prices in
logging-only scenarios (Supplementary Fig. 6). Likewise, reducing
the minimum threshold for timber harvest to 30 cm DBH
increased breakeven carbon prices of intact forest to $5.23 ($2.23–
$9.61) per tCO2 in dense forest and $6.26 ($3.52–$16.22) per
tCO2 in open forest, with the opportunity cost of logging in open
forests more than doubling to $3,373 ($1,214–$6,346) per ha,
owing to the high density of class I and II stems 30–40 cm DBH
in open forest (Supplementary Table 2).
Discussion
Our ﬁndings show that forest conversion to rubber may currently
generate far more revenue than a carbon ﬁnance scheme, but that
proﬁts from logging are sufﬁciently low for carbon ﬁnance to be a
competitive alternative when rubber is not a threat. Under cur-
rent market conditions, avoiding deforestation for rubber thus
requires recognition of environmental, social or other ecosystem
service beneﬁts of forests by governments, and a willingness to
accept apparent economic costs. However, for dense forests, mean
breakeven prices were closely aligned to estimates of the social
cost of carbon, and when considering relatively low rubber prices,
breakeven carbon prices for both forest types were substantially
below the social cost. This makes forest conversion to rubber a
poor option from a global perspective on cost-effective climate
change mitigation.
We used a conservative value of $36 per tCO2 for the social
cost of carbon, based on estimates developed for and used by the
government of the United States13,17. In contrast, a 2011 review
calculated a mean of $177 per tCO2 (SD $293 per tCO2)16 and
subsequent analyses gave estimates of $103–$138 per tCO214 or
$220 per tCO215. Considering these higher estimates, preventing
forest conversion to rubber represents cost-effective action to
reduce emissions, even for intact open forests. However, the social
cost of carbon is based on the premise of a global cost-beneﬁt
exercise, comparing the economic cost of carbon emissions to the
cost of controlling emissions12. A key issue is that, even where
these cost estimates align, in the absence of a global carbon pri-
cing mechanism the path from a calculated social cost of carbon
to compensation for the local-scale costs of avoided emissions is
unclear.
There are indications that carbon market prices could be raised
much closer to the social cost of carbon in some sectors to meet
climate change targets: for instance, if recent proposals to set a
price ﬂoor of €20–€30 (~$23–$34) per tCO2 on the EU Emissions
Trading Scheme come to fruition, a new global benchmark could
be set32. Recent research investigating the incentives required to
decarbonise the energy sector to meet the Paris Agreement targets
(i.e., limiting global temperature rise to below 2 oC) similarly
found the need to introduce carbon prices to the industry and
power sectors of all countries, with prices of $20 per tCO2 by 2020
and $120 per tCO2 by 2030 in OECD countries, $10–$90 per
tCO2 in major emerging economies, and $5–$30 per tCO2 else-
where33. Carbon ﬁnance for dense forests could then be nearly as
lucrative as conversion to rubber in the near-term, while in the
longer-term, prices could be high enough to defend even open
forests, notwithstanding the risk of unintended market feedbacks
arising from restricted supply (see below)34. We also note that
even if full opportunity costs of conservation are not met, smaller
ﬁnancial incentives to conserve forest may be an attractive option
if there is existing social or political pressure to conserve, or
where non-market values are recognised.
Open forests tend to be drier with poorer sandier soils35 and
thus may have lower agricultural potential. We incorporated the
effect of delayed maturation of rubber under drier open forest
conditions, but robust data on rubber yields in such conditions
are notably lacking36. Poorer growth could also result in lower
rubber carbon stocks1,3, reducing the breakeven price needed to
match rubber proﬁts in open forest areas, and improving the
prospects for protection using carbon ﬁnance. Robust data on the
relative yield and carbon stocks of rubber plantations established
on former open or dense forests are urgently required3. However,
where land proves unfavourable for rubber, the high potential
NPV of cassava, known to grow successfully in less favourable
environments, at least in the short term (Supplementary Table 5),
reinforces the importance of other mechanisms to curb forest
conversion.
Although rapid expansion of cassava for animal feed con-
tributed to serious deforestation of northern Thailand in the late
20th century37, and in Cambodia cassava expanded at a similar
rate to rubber within the last decade (see Methods), in the longer-
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term, cassava extent has been relatively stable across Asia (3.9
million ha in 1981, 4.1 million ha in 2014), although yields nearly
doubled (11.9 t per ha per year in 1981, 21.9 t per ha per year in
201438). This contrasts strongly with Asian rubber extent, which
almost doubled from 5.1 million ha in 1981 to 9.8 million ha in
2014, despite similar yield increases (0.7 t per ha per year in 1981,
1.2 t per ha per year in 2014)38. Thus, although we estimate
median NPV to be greater for cassava than rubber, demand does
not currently appear to be driving expansion of cassava onto
forest to the same degree as rubber in Asia. In addition, Cam-
bodian cassava growers currently face problems accessing mar-
kets and supply chains, and depletion of soil quality and declining
yields with repeated cultivation are known issues39. We
acknowledge that this may reduce the cassava NPV realised by
farmers relative to our estimates, although we have been unable to
quantify this (Supplementary Table 5). Nevertheless, use as a
biofuel feedstock may further increase cassava demand within
Asia and at the global level it is rapidly expanding40. Together
with our high estimated NPV for cassava this suggests that,
although not currently a major regional driver of deforestation in
Asia, the importance of cassava may increase.
We have used a non-spatial approach to estimate breakeven
carbon prices for dense and open forest in mainland Southeast
Asia. We show that rubber NPV is likely substantially lower in
open than in dense forest areas, and were able to incorporate
geographic variability in timber and carbon stocks, which inﬂu-
enced breakeven carbon prices. Additional spatial variation in
rubber NPV and carbon breakeven prices will be generated by
distance to markets, regional farm gate prices, yields (affected by
soil type and quality, topography, elevation, water availability,
planting material, etc.), and labour costs, amongst others. How-
ever, spatially explicit data on potential rubber NPV are not
currently available for most of mainland Southeast Asia, includ-
ing Cambodia, not least because recently established plantations
are not yet productive. This precluded meaningful marginal cost
curve analyses to quantify the additional area of rubber expansion
that could potentially be avoided with incremental increases in
carbon price. Such spatial analysis has been conducted locally for
Xishuangbanna, a hotspot of rubber expansion in Southwest
China, where ﬁeld data from existing plantations show that NPV
decreases with greater elevation, particularly above 900 m asl21,41.
Once context-speciﬁc rubber yield, price and cost data become
available, marginal cost analyses may be possible for mainland
Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, if carbon ﬁnance focuses on the
cheapest avoided emissions ﬁrst, making each additional tonne of
carbon more expensive than the last, initial efforts to protect
forests from rubber might only require prices at the low end of
our presented range. However, if forests have good potential for
conversion to rubber but are also priorities for conservation using
carbon ﬁnance, due to high carbon densities and/or biodiversity
value, costs may be much higher.
While we have assessed the likelihood of success for carbon
ﬁnance schemes in tackling forest conversion to rubber under
current conditions, and considered a range of potential price
changes, rubber prices may rise in the future if rubber production
is constrained relative to demand due to restriction of planting in
forested areas34. The design of any initiative attempting to pre-
vent forest conversion to rubber would therefore need to account
for potential market feedbacks generated through conservation
activities, which could otherwise generate net negative outcomes
for carbon emissions and biodiversity34. Ultimately, the demand
for natural rubber might only be mitigated through further
development of synthetic alternatives (although these are cur-
rently petroleum based and may represent a worse outcome for
carbon emissions), or though improvements in methods for
recycling natural rubber.
We compared mutually exclusive management options, for a
hypothetical hectare of forested land, using a cost beneﬁt analysis
framework based on a single metric, NPV. This approach
assumes that the single land use with the highest NPV will be
preferred, and that if carbon prices match this NPV (together
with the transaction and implementation costs of protecting
forest), then forest protection will be the preferred option.
However, as this does not incorporate other inﬂuences on land-
use decisions, such as variability in future returns (uncertainty,
used here synonymously with risk42), it provides only an
approximation of the costs of forest protection, and the level of
carbon ﬁnance payments needed to inﬂuence decision-making.
Decision makers, including low-income farmers in the tropics,
tend to be risk averse43. A key strategy for reducing risk is to
diversify income sources by establishing a portfolio of land uses,
that provides income resilience despite lower ﬁnancial returns, for
instance by growing a range of crops with independently ﬂuc-
tuating yields42,43. Alternative approaches to economic analysis of
PES schemes, that incorporate risk management and the option
to assess multiple land uses simultaneously, include “Optimised
Land-Use Diversiﬁcation”, which considers portfolios of multiple
land uses, returns, and risk42, and stochastic dominance, with44
or without45 land use portfolios. Portfolio theory46 has also been
used to assess decision making around a variety of natural
resource and land use problems47.
Understanding the likely outcome of risk aversion in the
context of rubber expansion can be considered within two broad
scenarios: ﬁrst, planting in large estates by companies (as in this
analysis), and second, planting by smallholder farmers. In the ﬁrst
scenario, a company may already have a diverse portfolio of land
holdings (each covering hundreds or thousands of hectares)
across multiple locations, of which a rubber plantation could
form a single component. This scenario is relevant for Cambodia,
where large tracts of forested land are allocated for speciﬁc, single,
purposes (Economic Land Concessions for a rubber plantation48,
or establishment of a protected area). We consider diversiﬁcation
within a single large land holding unlikely in the Cambodian
context. Furthermore, carbon ﬁnance schemes in Cambodia have
so far been established to avoid deforestation of large intact forest
areas22. Thus, in the context of this study, assumptions under-
lying alternative modelling approaches such as Portfolio Theory
may not be strongly relevant.
In the second scenario, a smallholder may split a handful of
hectares of land among multiple crops (cash or subsistence);
particularly relevant in countries where rubber production on
much smaller land holdings is the norm (such as Thailand or
China2). Risk-averse behaviour by such farmers could favour the
uptake of PES schemes if they are perceived to offer stable
income, although opportunity costs remain key43. However, the
outcome of incorporating risk aversion into calculation of PES
payments in the context of smallholder farmers is variable.
Models of forest conversion in South America that incorporated
risk aversion reduced predicted carbon payments (needed to
offset opportunity costs) by more than half relative to models that
ignored risk; incorporating a portfolio of land uses, price-supply
relationships, demand shifts and agricultural intensiﬁcation also
reduced predicted carbon payments relative to solely considering
compensation for the single highest-value land use42. In contrast,
conservation payment levels required to retain shade coffee versus
conversion to maize in Ecuador increased up to twofold when
accounting for risk aversion, due to higher revenue variability for
coffee than maize44, but subsequent analysis that incorporated
plantain revenue (planted within coffee agroforests), reversed this
pattern49. Application of alternative modelling approaches may
thus be particularly valuable in the context of smallholder rubber
farms.
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Additional caveats to our ﬁndings are that we assume a single
land use is established and maintained for a 25-year period; while
this assumption is likely to hold for rubber plantations that are
typically managed on a 25-year rotation18, this is less likely for
shorter rotation crops such as cashew (10 years) or cassava (one
year). Our cost beneﬁt analysis also ignores the near irreversibility
of deforestation (compared to the relative ease of switching
between alternative agricultural land uses), which may reduce
required compensation payments45.
As with the other approaches discussed here, the use of NPV
fails to capture the full utility value of alternatives, including non-
carbon ecosystem services, health or cultural beneﬁts of retaining
forests, or the impacts of agricultural conversion on water quality,
soils, or food security. Individual farmers’ decisions might also be
inﬂuenced by governmental policies, regulations, land and cli-
matic conditions, gender, demography, and values43. Multi-
criteria decision-making models are another alternative analytical
approach, which could incorporate such non-market considera-
tions together with risk50. Lastly, we recognise that decisions
about participating in a carbon ﬁnance scheme, such as REDD+,
involve an additional and speciﬁc suite of considerations51,
including internationally agreed targets and commitments to halt
climate change.
While our results suggest there are major impediments to the
use of carbon ﬁnancing in halting rubber expansion, they show
that selective logging alone could be prevented by such payments.
In contrast to the timber volumes of mainland Southeast Asia’s
dense forests calculated in this study, timber volumes in forests of
insular Southeast Asia are substantially higher (84.9 ± 9.0 SE per
m3 per ha, 50–60 cm DBH52). This translates into higher timber
proﬁts ($5,563 ± 757 SE per ha in dense forest52), requiring
higher carbon prices to match the opportunity costs of logging
(eg, $22–$28 per tCO228) than on the mainland. However, despite
the substantial and robust forest inventory dataset that underpins
this study, and the relatively low estimated timber proﬁts com-
pared to rubber cultivation, the presence of high-value luxury
timbers53 poses a distinct problem for timber valuation in
mainland Southeast Asia. Timber prices, particularly for luxury
species, increase up the supply chain (Supplementary Table 8)
and the Cambodian timber trade is highly opaque, involving
informal payment systems and considerable illegality48,53. Such
issues are found across mainland Southeast Asia. Although using
local-level timber prices was appropriate due to the lack of formal
timber markets, this underestimates total opportunity costs
accruing to hidden but powerful actors, especially those selling
timber illegally on international markets. These additional
opportunity costs may play out through pressure on govern-
mental decision makers, particularly those involved in land
allocation. Thus, forest conservation efforts based on climate
change or biodiversity outcomes cannot, in this context, be
divorced from social demands for governance and
accountability48.
In the context of current carbon ﬁnance markets and funds for
REDD+, policy initiatives are urgently needed if we are to stem
emissions of forest carbon, and the loss of irreplaceable biodi-
versity, caused by rubber expansion onto forest in mainland
Southeast Asia. These include: (1) a rubber sustainability initiative
that restricts market access for deforestation rubber and/or offers
a price premium for non-deforestation rubber; (2) zero-
deforestation pledges from major corporate rubber consumers;
and 3) governmental regulatory or economic incentives for forest
conservation that couple improved forest governance with
effective land-use planning. One emerging tool is the High Car-
bon Stock (HCS) approach, currently being considered for land-
use planning of oil palm in Southeast Asia54, but it is currently
unclear whether land covers classiﬁed as appropriate for
agricultural conversion (vegetation cover with ≤75 per tC per ha
or deﬁned as “shrub and open lands”54,55) would encompass the
open forests of mainland Southeast Asia. Should HCS gain
widespread traction, an urgent policy priority is to ensure that
open forests are protected under HCS. Finally, if such incentives
or actions are appropriately designed to also tackle threats from
other cash crops, such as cassava, this could unlock the potential
for carbon markets to help protect the unique forests of mainland
Southeast Asia from selective logging.
Methods
Study region. We used data from Cambodia as a case study for lowland areas of
mainland Southeast Asia, and for the Indo-Burma biodiversity hotspot, that covers
Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, most of Myanmar and Thailand, and parts of Southwest
China, including Xishuangbanna and Hainan Island56. Ten million ha of forest
covered 55% of Cambodia in 201025, but the country now has the world’s ﬁfth
highest deforestation rate57. Cambodian forests range from fully deciduous to
almost completely evergreen35,58 but can be categorised into two broad groups:
“dense forest” comprises evergreen and semi-evergreen stands, with tree heights
reaching 35–55 m; “open forest” comprises areas of dry deciduous dipterocarp and
mixed-deciduous forests, with tree heights reaching 25–35 m22. Swamp and hill
evergreen forest types found in some periodically inundated or mountainous
areas35,58 were not considered in this study.
The expansion of rubber is strongly promoted by the Cambodian government;
rubber area increased by 175% between 2009 and 2013, to 328,800 ha59. Cashew,
cassava and sugar areas have also increased: cassava by 163% from 2009, to
421,000 ha in 201359; sugarcane by 76% from 2009, to 23,810 ha in 201359; and
cashew by 275% from 2000, to 60,000 ha in 2005, with no recent data available60.
Timber is logged both illegally, and legally under licences for infrastructure projects
and industrial-scale plantations (Economic Land Concessions), including of
rubber48,53,61,62. Illegal logging of high-value timber is common, involving a range
of actors63 (Supplementary Note 1). Smallholders seeking agricultural land for
subsistence or cash crops, ﬁrewood and timber also drive deforestation22.
Opportunities for using forest carbon ﬁnance to protect forests in mainland
Southeast Asia are being actively explored. Cambodia, alongside Vietnam and Lao
PDR, is being supported by the UN-REDD (Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and Forest Degradation) program64, and has begun the REDD+
Readiness process with assistance from the World Bank’s Forest Carbon
Partnership Facility (FCPC) and UN-REDD, in anticipation of developing a
national-level program64. A number of pilot REDD+ demonstration projects are
underway, seeking funding from voluntary carbon markets65.
Modelling opportunity costs and carbon breakeven prices. Opportunity costs
were deﬁned as forgone direct proﬁts from logging, the net present value (NPV) of
rubber in large plantations or of other cash-crop agriculture (cassava, cashew, and
sugarcane, in large plantations or smallholdings), and cash income from collecting
dipterocarp tree resin, which is forgone once dipterocarp trees are felled (Sup-
plementary Note 2). This traditional livelihood activity directly conﬂicts with
logging, because resin-producing species also have valuable timber66, being listed as
class II species (Supplementary Data 1). Total opportunity cost was thus based on
forgone proﬁts from logging and/or rubber, offset by lost resin revenue where class
I and II trees are logged out. We do not estimate other non-timber forest product
beneﬁts (Supplementary Note 2).
We did not distinguish between legal and illegal activities, as we wished to
understand the underlying economic drivers of forest conversion, while
acknowledging that when designing actual incentive mechanisms there may be
good reasons for treating legal revenue streams differently from illegal ones, so as to
avoid indirectly rewarding illegal behaviour. However, timber revenue was
calculated as a farm-gate price and we did not consider legal downstream beneﬁts
that accrue to the wider economy, nor those beneﬁts of doubtful legality that accrue
mainly to non-local actors, including agro-industrial companies and elite logging
“tycoons”48,53,62, such as the sale of high value timber on the international market
(Supplementary Table 8, although export of logs and most sawn timber is illegal;
Supplementary Note 1). These exclusions are likely to lead to an under-estimate of
opportunity cost, but are appropriate given the absence of any robust data on these
beneﬁts, and the need for any forest carbon ﬁnance scheme to operate
transparently and legally. Hence, our calculations provide a minimum estimate of
the economic challenge that a forest carbon ﬁnance scheme may face in inﬂuencing
land use decisions.
To calculate carbon breakeven prices, we incorporated the following
parameters: timber proﬁt (assuming a single offtake; $ per ha), forest carbon stock
(tC per ha), post-deforestation land-use carbon stock (tC per ha), 25-year
discounted resin revenue (10% discount rate; $ per ha) and 25-year NPV of rubber
or cash crops (10% discount rate, $ per ha). All input costs and prices were adjusted
to 2013 US$ before analysis; all output values are thus in 2013 US$.
When calculating each parameter, to account for both uncertainties within, and
variance between, data sources, values were resampled for each of 10,000 model
iterations from either a normal distribution deﬁned by the mean and standard
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error of the mean (SE; used to resample timber volume, carbon stock values and
agricultural farm gate prices, for which the distribution of values was known), or a
uniform distribution bounded by minimum and maximum estimates (used to
resample agricultural yields, agricultural input costs, timber prices and timber
extraction costs, for which the underlying distribution of parameter values was
unknown; Supplementary Table 9).
All parameter values were resampled independently at each iteration, with the
exception of timber volume (m3 per ha) and carbon stock (tC per ha). For these, a
single forest inventory was randomly selected for each model iteration, in order to
capture geographic variation without bias from relative inventory extent
(Supplementary Table 1), and thereby avoiding the need for weighting. For each
forest inventory, the mean and SE of timber volume, carbon stock and stem density
(Supplementary Data 1) were calculated per tree species, and thus each royalty
class. Where trees of smaller size classes were sampled from subplots nested within
main plots (Supplementary Table 1), standardised values (per ha) still allowed
mean and SE to be calculated per royalty and size class and, as the numbers of
subplots and main plots were equal within each such inventory (Supplementary
Table 1), no weightings were required. From the selected inventory, timber
volumes and carbon stocks were simultaneously sampled from the same point in
their distribution relative to the mean, as values of timber volume and carbon stock
were likely to be correlated.
Stem-speciﬁc timber volume and carbon stock estimates (derived separately
from DBH) were negatively skewed across all forest inventories. To address this,
timber and carbon densities per plot were square-root transformed before
calculating the mean and SE for each forest inventory, reducing the inﬂuence of
infrequent plots with exceptionally high timber and carbon density. Timber and
carbon values resampled from the resulting normal distribution were back-
transformed before use in the model. Carbon stocks and wood volumes are
presented in results as the unweighted mean and 95% conﬁdence interval across all
10,000 iterations.
Agricultural yields, costs and farm-gate prices for all crops were sampled
independently for each iteration, but the position within the distribution for each
parameter was held constant across each crop type for each iteration. Resin
production and prices were also sampled independently for each iteration. By
sampling yields, input costs and farm-gate prices independently, we underestimate
variability in NPV relative to that potentially arising if variation in these
parameters were correlated, for example due to site location. Similarly, although
parameter values varied between model iterations, we assumed a constant temporal
yield-curve over the 25 years and did not incorporate inter-annual stochastic
variability.
Opportunity costs of logging and rubber (or other cash-crops; offset by lost
resin revenue; $ per ha) and breakeven carbon prices needed to offset the
opportunity costs, plus setup (transaction) and implementation costs (based on
emitted forest carbon offset by post-deforestation land-use carbon stocks; $ per
tCO2) were then generated for each scenario. Results are presented as the median
and interquartile range across 10,000 model iterations. Indicative real-world carbon
prices (Supplementary Table 4) are shown in relation to breakeven carbon prices.
Timber proﬁts. Forest inventories (Supplementary Fig. 2) were used to estimate
timber volumes. Five inventories used ﬁxed sampling areas (3.1–60 ha total per
landscape; Supplementary Table 1) while inventory F05 used variable radius
plots67. Within forest types, sites had similar relative distributions of size classes for
all trees (Supplementary Fig. 4, Supplementary Table 10) and within royalty classes
(Supplementary Fig. 9). In each, all trees ≥ 10 cm DBH were measured and iden-
tiﬁed to species level; nomenclature was standardised across datasets following The
Plant List Version 1.1 (2013)68. Vines were not recorded. Tree species were
assigned to one of ﬁve royalty (value) classes: luxury, I, II, III, or non-classiﬁed
(NC; Supplementary Data 1) based on a government list of timber species69. The
14 luxury timber species included Burmese Rosewood (Dalbergia oliveri, com-
monly called D. bariensis in Cambodia (Supplementary Data 1), IUCN EN, CITES
Appendix II), Siamese Rosewood (D. cochinchinensis, VU, CITES Appendix II) and
Burmese Padauk (Pterocarpus macrocarpus, unassessed). All Dipterocarp species
were class I or II and included popular timber species (e.g. Dipterocarpus alatus,
EN and Anisoptera scaphula, CR); other popular timber species in class I were
Sindora siamensis, LC, and Heritiera (Tarrietia) javanica, unassessed63).
Logging revenues depend on the minimum tree size commercially harvested,
which may differ according to royalty class. Luxury species are exceptionally
valuable and even small amounts are harvested70; we therefore assumed all luxury
trees ≥ 10 cm DBH would be logged. For class I and II species, we assumed a
minimum harvestable DBH of 40 cm, but also explored the effect of reducing
minimum harvestable DBH to 30 cm (Supplementary Note 1; Supplementary
Table 2). Class III trees (that are used for local construction or fuelwood) and non-
classiﬁed timbers (assumed to be only useful as fuelwood) ≥ 40 cm DBH were
initially assumed to have market value (Supplementary Table 8). However,
extraction of class III and non-classiﬁed timbers was found to incur a net cost in
open forest (−$57, −$456 to −$21 per ha) and in dense forest (−$1,336, −$2,096
to −$850 per ha), despite assuming relatively low timber extraction costs, that
involved selective logging activity by local people in Cambodia in a “business-as-
usual” scenario with no formal logging concessions, inventories, management plan,
or demarcation of logging areas. Costs included: wage labour, food, motorbike fuel,
ox-cart transportation to the roadside/village and chainsaw maintenance, but
excluded the capital cost of the chainsaw. If class III and non-classiﬁed classes were
to be extracted, this would likely be for ﬁrewood or construction locally (with
extraction costs subsumed within non-market subsistence livelihood activities), or
through destructive clearance during land preparation for agriculture (already
considered in establishment costs for scenarios of agricultural conversion;
Supplementary Table 11). Therefore, maximum potential timber proﬁt accrued
solely from logging luxury, class I and class II timber, and we assumed that the
opportunity cost of protecting forests from further logging after the “Luxury, I, II
timber logged” scenarios was reduced to zero (Fig. 3, Supplementary Table 2).
The timber proﬁt remaining in the forest (Rx; $ per ha) in each logging scenario
x, representing the opportunity cost of intervening at that point to protect timber
remaining within the forest from further logging, was calculated as shown in
equation (1):
Rx ¼
X5
a¼1
Va ´ pa  Cð Þ ð1Þ
Where Va is the timber volume (m3 per ha) of timber royalty class a (ﬁve classes;
Supplementary Data 1), estimated using Cambodian government standard timber
equations (Supplementary Table 12) reduced by 20% to account for wastage71, pa is
the timber price ($ per m3) for that royalty class (Supplementary Tables 8 and 13),
and C the cost ($ per m3) of extraction to the roadside or village (Supplementary
Table 14). Timber prices were estimated at the local (roadside or village) level in
the absence of formal timber markets.
Forest carbon stocks. As for timber volume, forest inventories (Supplementary
Table 1) were used to estimate forest carbon stocks for all stems ≥ 10 cm DBH, per
royalty class, per forest plot, quantifying AGB and BGB22. AGB per plot and per
royalty class (t per ha) was calculated using the Chave D Moist forest equation,
using DBH only72, veriﬁed via destructive sampling for a REDD+ pilot project in
Cambodia22. Species-speciﬁc wood density was used where possible73; other species
were assigned the mean wood density for the genus within the same region or, if no
values were available for the genus, the mean wood density of all tree species across
all inventories. BGB was estimated as 24% of AGB per plot74. AGB and BGB were
summed, and multiplied by 0.5 to give estimated carbon content (tC per ha)72.
Deadwood and SOC pools were not estimated; deadwood accounts for only 3% of
emissions reductions from avoided deforestation, and SOC stocks are assumed not
to change when land use conversion is to perennial crops according to the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) tier 1 carbon outcome calculation
methods, and the carbon accounting methodology used for the REDD+ pilot
project in Cambodia22.
Post-deforestation land-use carbon stocks. We estimated the AGB and BGB
carbon stocks of post-deforestation land-use classes which may partially offset
forest carbon emissions. Time-averaged carbon stocks (taCs) were estimated for
each crop type, which give the mean C stock over a plantation cycle from planting
to harvesting3,75. This approach allows carbon stock estimates to be scaled up from
a single plot to the landscape level, comparison of land uses with different rotation
lengths, accommodates clearance and carbon release at the end of the crop rota-
tion, and better reﬂects the net carbon outcomes and long term climate impact of a
transition from one steady-state land use to another than a time series of carbon
ﬂuxes76,77. The taCs approach is consistent with the IPCC Good Practice Guide-
lines78 and the carbon accounting methodology used for the REDD+ pilot project
in Cambodia22.
The carbon stock estimate for rubber (52.5 tC per ha) was based on multiple
estimates of taCs calculated either as the carbon stock in the median year of the
plantation cycle using logistic or Gompertz models of growth, or 50% of the carbon
stock in the ﬁnal year of the plantation cycle assuming a linear biomass increase3.
Time-averaged carbon stocks of other crops (cashew 22.3 tC per ha, sugarcane 6.8
tC per ha, cassava 2.5 tC per ha) were estimated as 50% of the carbon stock
accumulated at the maximum rotation length (Supplementary Table 6). As for
forests, soil carbon stocks were not considered, although there is strong evidence
for soil carbon reductions when forest is converted to rubber3 or other tree cash
crops27.
Resin revenue. The potential revenue generated by resin collection over a 25-year
period (D; $ per ha; years 0–24 inclusive) was calculated following equation (2):
D ¼
X24
n¼0
t ´ ið Þ ´ y½  ´ pR
1þ rð Þn ð2Þ
where t is resin tree stem density per ha (from forest inventories), i the likely
proportion of productive trees (i.e., excluding non-starter or exhausted trees that
do not yield), y the resin yield (litres per stem per year) and pR the resin price ($ per
litre; Supplementary Table 15). Resin revenue is discounted over a 25-year time-
frame n (years 0–24 inclusive) using a discount rate r of 10%, with no discount
applied in year 0. All trees ≥ 30 cm DBH can potentially be tapped, with no
identiﬁed relationship between resin yield and DBH; labour costs were not
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included in calculation of resin proﬁts, as resin tends to be collected only when
there are few or no alternative wage options66.
Agricultural net present value. We estimated likely farm-gate proﬁts for rubber
and other cash crops using region-speciﬁc data (Supplementary Tables 5 and 11).
The 25-year discounted net present value (NPV, $ per ha; Pb) of each potential crop
(b; rubber, cashew, cassava, sugar) was calculated as shown in equation (3):
Pb ¼
X24
n¼0
yb ´ pbð Þ  Cb
1þ rð Þn ð3Þ
where yb is the year-speciﬁc yield (t per ha per year), pb the price ($ per t) and Cb
the cost of production ($ per ha per year). Proﬁts are discounted over a 25-year
timeframe n (years 0–24 inclusive) using a discount rate r of 10%, with no discount
applied in year 0. In the case of annual crops, an “end-of-year” perspective is taken,
whereby returns accrue in the same year as crop establishment.
A comparison of the spatial distribution of historically suitable environmental
space for rubber1 and the spatial distribution of deciduous dipterocarp forest
(DDF24; which shares many characteristics with our open forest category, although
often in ﬁne-grained mosaic with mixed deciduous and other forest types) shows
most DDF lies outside the optimal zones for rubber cultivation. Reduced rubber
yields were predicted (though the magnitude of reduction was not deﬁned) in areas
of drought risk, deﬁned as <60 mm rainfall per month for >5 months per year, and/
or <1,200 mm rainfall per year and/or <20 mm rainfall during the driest quarter1.
This drought risk deﬁnition overlaps with the bioclimatic limits of DDF
(1,000–1,500 mm rainfall per year with a deﬁned dry season)24. Although rubber
yield reductions due to drought have not been quantiﬁed, reduced dry season
growth can delay the onset of tapping from the sixth to the tenth year after
planting36. We therefore delayed the onset of tapping in the plantation cycle in
open forest scenarios (Supplementary Table 11).
To accommodate change in annual yield across a 25-year production cycle,
model iteration-speciﬁc yield curves were simulated separately for each crop
(Supplementary Fig. 10, Supplementary Table 11), using a single iteration-speciﬁc
randomly-generated yield index (proportionate between minimum and maximum
values, uniform distribution). Crop-speciﬁc production costs were sampled from a
uniform distribution between the minimum and maximum values available in the
literature (Supplementary Table 11) and crop-speciﬁc farm-gate prices were used
(Supplementary Table 5 and 11).
Breakeven carbon prices. The breakeven carbon price (Exb; $ per tCO2) required
to offset the opportunity cost of forest conservation ((Rx–D)+ Pb) and cover the
costs of REDD+ project setup (one-off transaction cost) and implementation
(discounted over 25 years; G; $ per ha) for each scenario of logging (x) and crop (b,
including the option of no crop) was calculated as shown in equation (4):
Exb ¼ Rx  Dð Þ þ Pb½  þ G3:67 ´Zx
ð4Þ
where Zx is the residual carbon stock (tC per ha) of all trees ≥ 10 cm DBH
remaining in each logging scenario (x) and 3.67 the conversion factor from tC to
tCO228. Carbon stocks of post-deforestation land-uses were subtracted from Zx
when exploring the impact of incorporating these stocks on carbon breakeven
prices. Estimated PES project setup ($4.95 per ha) and implementation costs
($9.47–$13.09 per ha per year) were obtained from a multi-year spending history
and projected management expenditure budget for a pilot REDD+ project in
Cambodia (Wildlife Conservation Society, unpublished data). These costs fell well
within annual management and implementation cost estimates in existing litera-
ture, that range from $0.87–$20.01 per ha79. Annual implementation costs were
discounted and summed across a 25-year timescale.
Finally, sensitivity analyses explored the impacts on carbon breakeven price of:
increasing or decreasing timber, resin and agricultural commodity prices
(Supplementary Fig. 6), non-availability of resin markets (Supplementary Table 7),
reducing the threshold of commercially viable stem diameter on timber proﬁts
(Supplementary Table 2), and alternative discount rates of 5%, 8 and 15% as
applied to agricultural NPV and resin revenue (Supplementary Figs. 7, 8).
Leakage. The costs of controlling for leakage of avoided deforestation for rubber,
or forest degradation through selective logging, were not included in analyses.
Ultimately, the need for land for rubber expansion will only be mitigated through
reduction in global demand for natural rubber, which is reliant upon 1) global
markets and demand for products such as vehicle and aircraft tyres, 2) develop-
ment of alternatives to natural rubber, or 3) improvements in recycling methods.
Similarly, demand for timber, within and beyond mainland Southeast Asia, would
need to be met from well-managed sources before leakage of forest degradation or
conversion could be effectively controlled. However, a robust rubber sustainability
initiative, or corporate zero deforestation commitments, may displace rubber
plantations to sites where land use conversion entails negligible net carbon emis-
sions. We have therefore not attempted to incorporate the cost of controlling
leakage in this analysis.
Data availability. A summary of the agricultural data used for this study are
shown in Supplementary Table 11, with data sources detailed in Supplementary
Table 5. Original forest inventory data (Supplementary Table 1, Supplementary
Fig. 2) are not publicly available, and were made available for sole use in this study
with permission of the following organisations and co-authors: F01 by Permian
Global in collaboration with Ecometrica and Birdlife Cambodia; F02 and F03 by
the Forestry Administration of the Royal Government of Cambodia, Wildlife
Conservation Society Cambodia Program and Wildlife Conservation Society Glo-
bal Conservation Program; F04 by Cambodia Development Resource Institute
(CDRI); F05 by D.P. Bebber and F.H. Lambrick; and F06 by I. Theilade, J.F.
Maxwell and P. Chhang. Derived data supporting the ﬁndings of this study, and all
R scripts used to resample data and run the models, are available from the cor-
responding author on reasonable request.
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